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Abstract. A strong argument can be made for the prime importance of information in the context of an economic 
recession. It is in times of crisis that information on the state of the economy is abundant and citizens have 
incentives to acquire it in order to sanction incumbents for mismanagement of the economy. Simultaneously, 
however, economic hardship strains people’s cognitive resources and motivations to seek relevant information. 
Using a novel research design, we assess how the recent economic recession has shaped information acquisition. 
Our results indicate that while personal economic hardship depresses levels of information, the recession overall 
boosted considerably the public’s knowledge of the state of the economy and, to a lesser degree, of parties’ policy 
positions in elections. For both economic and electoral types of information, economically marginal groups caught 
up to the economically secure in contexts of economic hardship, thereby reducing information inequalities. We 
discuss the findings’ implications for representative democracy.  
Keywords: Electoral information; economic information; gaps in political knowledge; economic crisis; economic 
voting. 
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Few would dispute the need for an informed citizenry in a representative democracy. Study after study demonstrates 
that representative democracy functions far better when the masses are well informed (e.g., Andersen, Tilley & 
Heath 2005; Goren, 1997; Hobolt, 2005; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Luskin, 2003; Popkin & Dimock 1999). 
Information of public affairs boosts political participation and tolerance of minorities, and contributes to stronger 
mass-elite linkages, with positive consequences for political representation and accountability (e.g., Delli Carpini 
and Keeter, 1996; Gomez & Wilson 2001; Sniderman et al., 1990). From a normative point of view, the relevance of 
political information is ever more important in the context of an economic recession. After all, it is in times of crisis 
that citizens ought to monitor public affairs most closely and sanction policymakers, if warranted. This article 
examines just how informed citizens were of economics and politics during the recent economic recession. 
The extant literature offers contradictory hunches on how a plummeting economy may affect citizens’ 
information-seeking behavior. On one hand, scholars argue that socioeconomic resources are crucial to political 
engagement as they afford citizens both the resources and motivation needed to participate (e.g., Norris 2002; 
Dalton, Van Sickle & Weldon 2009). Economic duress ought to then stymy the acquisition of new information. On 
the other hand, economic crises provide a context in which the issues at stake ought to motivate citizens to pay close 
attention to politicians’ decisions and keep abreast of the economic and political situation (Martin 2008; Shen 2009). 
According to the latter view, worsening economic conditions ought to boost information acquisition. Research on 
the determinants of political knowledge considers economic duress at the individual level and falls short of 
analyzing the effects of a macro-level economic crisis on information acquisition (e.g., Fraile 2014; Gordon & 
Segura 1997; Grönlund & Milner 2006).  
To understand how informed citizens are in times of economic upheaval, we first distinguish between 
economic hardship at the individual level and an economic recession at the macro level, and then consider explicitly 
their interaction. When economic hardship is experienced personally, it puts a strain on citizens’ cognitive resources 
and motivation to engage in politics (Hassell and Settle 2017; Levine 2015; Marx and Nguyen 2016; Solt 2008), 
thus likely resulting in lower levels of information. A far-reaching macroeconomic crisis, however, is likely to 
trigger alarm and generate grievances about poor macroeconomic conditions among the general public, far and 
beyond those who are directly affected by the crisis (cf. Bahry and Lipsmeyer 2001; Burden & Wichowsky 2012; 
Pacek, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2009; Pontiachelli & Voth 2011). Hence, and controlling for between-individual 
socioeconomic differences, a macroeconomic crisis should, on average, boost levels of information. What is more, 
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in the context of a widespread economic hardship, poor citizens are more likely to relate their worsening personal 
economy to the national economy and to place blame on the government’s mismanagement of the economy instead 
of themselves. We argue that, as a result, the economically underprivileged are more motivated to acquire 
information about public affairs during a recession than in times of economic stability or prosperity. 
Second, we distinguish between economic and electoral types of information because the availability and 
clarity of each type may vary in the context of an economic recession. Information on the state of the economy 
becomes more abundant during a crisis due to the disproportionate media coverage of negative economic 
performance (Soroka 2006). In contrast, political parties do not necessarily put forth clearer economic policy 
proposals during a recession. Recent studies suggest that voters receive more ambiguous policy messages during a 
recession, as exemplified by the rise of populist parties that intentionally blur their positions on economic policy 
(Hernández & Kriesi 2015; Rovny 2013) or mainstream parties whose economic policy positions are difficult to 
pinpoint in the context of austerity (Bremer 2016; English, Grasso, Buraczynska, Karampampas & Temple 2016; 
Talving 2017). Economic crises, in short, may well boost the public’s information levels when it comes to the state 
of the economy but are less likely to have tangible effects on policy information levels in elections.  
Variation in economic conditions resulting from the Great Recession offers fruitful ground for testing these 
arguments. We tap into multiple sources of cross-sectional survey data and introduce a novel time-series component 
to help us assess how levels of information have varied as a result of the onset of the recession (Kern, Marien & 
Hooghe 2015). The findings offer support for distinguishing between personal economic duress and worsening 
macroeconomic conditions, on one hand, and between economic and electoral information types, on the other. 
Citizens are indeed less likely to be informed when they personally experience economic hardship. However, we 
uncover evidence of a process unravelling simultaneously; controlling for differences in individuals’ economic 
situation, citizens on the whole become better informed as macroeconomic conditions worsen. And furthermore, in 
the context of a recession, those citizens who experience personal economic hardship catch up quickly in 
information levels to the economically secure. While the direct effect of macroeconomic crises on information levels 
was modest, the recession was remarkably successful in closing the information gaps between those personally 
affected by the crisis and those who were not. There are important differences between economic and political 
information, however. While the gains in economic information levels are substantial, gains in electoral information 
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are modest. The latter type of information is less responsive to changes in macroeconomic conditions, possibly 
conditioned by how clearly electoral information is articulated by political actors.  
We believe that our results qualify a long-standing truism that citizens are unknowledgeable about public 
affairs and constitute overall good news for the functioning of representative democracy. The extant literature has 
painted a bleak picture of citizens’ motivation to stay informed and has underlined systematic inequalities in 
information levels among citizens (e.g., Bennett 1989; Healy & Lenz 2014; Hellwig & Marinova 2016; Howe 
2006). We contend that even though the public does not stay continuously informed of economics and politics, this 
is not necessarily bad news for representative democracy. Citizens tune in when it matters (for a related argument, 
see Schudson 1999). In times of economic crisis – that is, when the stakes are high – the public is more likely to 
keep abreast of public affairs, and the systematic inequalities in information acquisition are likely to dissipate.  
Information acquisition during economic downturns 
Three arguments may be made for the economy’s primary role in understanding information acquisition during an 
economic crisis (Shen 2009). For one, the economy is essentially a valence issue, such that all citizens support 
economic prosperity and are alarmed when the economy plummets. Second, economic crises are an important 
political issue as, by their sheer magnitude, they affect the lives of large segments of society. Finally, poor economic 
performance usually receives plenty of press and public attention, thus making it also a salient issue (Soroka 2006). 
These arguments are reinforced during severe and prolonged economic recessions, such as the Great Recession that 
began in 2008. Here we examine how economic adversity affects citizens’ cognitive resources and motivation to 
acquire information about public affairs.  
Consistent with the extant literature on political engagement (Brady, Verba & Schlozman 1995; Dalton et 
al. 2009; Emmenegger, Marx & Schraff 2017; Rosenstone 1982; Tillman 2008), we expect that the direct personal 
experience of economic adversity strains cognitive resources to acquire, retain and process information about public 
affairs, and further suppresses internal political efficacy. Together, the two mechanisms lead to observably lower 
levels of information. When it comes to cognitive resources, early studies have noted that economic strife focuses 
people’s attention on the most pressing material problems, such as applying for social benefits, borrowing money or 
moving into cheaper housing; hence less time, energy and attention are available for matters that are unrelated to 
economic struggles, including public affairs (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld & Zeisel 1972; Rosenstone 1982).  More recent 
research shows that economic hardship and the attendant anxiety diminish cognitive resources to devote to non-
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economic concerns (Hassell & Settle 2017; Levine 2015; Marx & Nguyen 2016). When people feel anxious, they 
are less able to engage in adaptive behaviour patterns (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo 2007), compromising 
their ability to pay attention to incoming information (Wegbreit, Franconeri & Beeman 2014), retain such 
information (Eysenck & Calvo 1992) or process it optimally (Leon & Revelle 1985). Anxiety has more generally 
been associated with impaired decision making (Gino, Wood & Schweitzer 2012; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & 
Welch 2001).  
When it comes to the motivation to acquire information, our expectations are consistent with the bulk of the 
literature showing a negative impact of economic hardship on internal political efficacy, or individuals’ perceived 
capacity to influence politics (e.g., Besley & Coate 1992; Marx & Nguyen 2016; Solt 2008).  Economic struggles 
have been linked to feelings of social stigma, isolation, insecurity and powerlessness, as well as to withdrawal from 
contact with peers (Fagin & Little 1984; Strandh 2000). Relatedly, feelings of anxiety have been linked to decreased 
self-confidence (Gino et al. 2012), which can also impair individuals’ perceived capacity to influence public affairs. 
In line with this research, we expect economic hardship to depress individuals’ perceived capacity to influence 
politics and, consequently, to lower their motivation to acquire information about public affairs. In short, our 
expectations are that those who struggle financially have less motivation and less cognitive resources to seek, retain 
and process information about public affairs. The observable implication of our argument is less knowledge about 
public affairs among the individuals who struggled economically during the crisis than among those who fared well. 
When the economic crisis is contextual rather than experienced directly, we expect that it will contribute to 
an overall spike in information acquisition, holding constant between-individual economic differences. This is for 
two related reasons. First, the pervasive nature of economic crises means that many individuals will come into 
contact with the economy beyond the group of individuals who are directly affected. We know that negative 
economic performance is disproportionately covered by the mass media (e.g., Goidel & Langley 1995; Harrington 
1989; Soroka 2006). Heightened press coverage of the economy makes macroeconomic information readily 
accessible to the public, also through political discussion and via social media (Eveland 2004). As a result, the 
abundance of information during an economic recession lowers its cost and facilitates its acquisition. Second, an 
economic recession is likely to trigger alarm among the public and generate grievances about the management of the 
economy. Such alarm can motivate citizens to seek further information in order to sanction incumbent governments 
for mismanagement of the economy (Shen 2009). A number of studies have shown that information seeking tends to 
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increase with the onset of intense political events that trigger alarm among the general public (Bennett & Paletz 
1994; Page & Shapiro 1992; Prior 2002). In line with our expectations, a slew of studies finds that deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions – from budget cuts to hikes in national unemployment – motivate citizens to engage in 
politics (Bahry and Lipsmeyer 2001; Burden & Wichowsky 2012; Pacek, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2009; Pontiachelli 
& Voth 2011). 
The flip side of our argument is that during times of economic stability and prosperity, citizens have fewer 
opportunities and are less motivated to acquire information about the economy. For one, the state of the economy is 
less salient in high times because media attention is disproportionately allocated toward negative performance; as a 
result, information about the economy is less forthcoming. Furthermore, satisfaction with the status quo, as in times 
of economic prosperity, has been shown to encourage people to rely on decision-making shortcuts rather than invest 
time and resources in becoming fully informed (Marcus, Neuman & MacKuen 2000). Economic crises thus facilitate 
the acquisition of economic information by readily supplying information and by providing an impetus for citizens 
to acquire it.   
Citizens who endure economic hardship likely display lower levels of knowledge than do citizens who do 
not personally experience economic hardship (Hypothesis 1). 
Citizens in contexts of declining macroeconomic conditions likely manifest higher levels of knowledge than 
do citizens in contexts of economic stability or prosperity (Hypothesis 2). 
While motivation to acquire electoral information may well increase during a recession, familiarity with 
party platforms also depends on the availability of information about parties (Banducci, Giebler & Kritzinger 2017). 
On this point, economic and electoral information stand apart. While it has been demonstrated that poor 
macroeconomic performance makes the headlines, there is little evidence that a plummeting economy triggers policy 
debate or spurs coverage of parties’ proposals to address economic woes. In fact, evidence from electoral 
competition in the aftermath of the Great Recession suggests just the opposite. Judging by the rise of populist parties 
of thin economic policy substance across Europe and the parallel demise of traditional mainstream parties during the 
financial crisis (Hernández & Kriesi 2015), the Great Recession may have contributed to a move away from 
constructive policy debate in the European democracies hardest hit by the recession. Voters in contexts of worsening 
economic conditions are exposed to less clear policy information because populist parties tend to blur intentionally 
their positions on economic policy (Rovny 2013) while mainstream parties implement externally imposed austerity 
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policies in discord with their electoral programs (English et al. 2016; Talving 2017). While citizens in contexts of 
economic crisis may well have greater incentives to acquire political information, as per Shen (2009), without the 
ready accessibility of clear policy information, such incentives are less likely to translate into familiarity with party 
positions. This leads us to expect that if a macroeconomic recession boosts knowledge of electoral alternatives, as 
per Hypothesis 2, the effect is likely to be modest. 
In addition to a direct effect of the economy, both at the individual and contextual levels, we expect a 
further conditional effect on information inequalities. This is because we expect individuals struck by economic 
hardship to behave differently in contexts where duress is widespread vis-à-vis contexts of general economic 
prosperity. The argument is as follows. Individuals who are struggling financially are more likely to relate their 
worsening personal economy to the national economy in a context of an economic crisis; as a result, we expect that 
they place blame for their personal economic situation on the government’s management of the economy instead of 
on themselves. As Foster and Matheson (1995: 1168) write, in the context of an economic crisis, “the personal 
becomes political”. This has consequences for individuals’ motivation to acquire information. Whereas the 
economically disadvantaged are generally stigmatized and experience lower political efficacy, we believe that they 
are likely to experience higher efficacy in the context of widespread economic strife than in context of general 
economic prosperity. For one, the stigma normally associated with poverty is likely lower when economic hardship 
is widespread. In this sense, the burden of economic hardship may be easier to sustain. And furthermore, in linking 
their personal situation to that of the national economy, citizens may perceive a potential solution to their personal 
economic woes in improvements to the national economy; this can serve as an impetus to acquire information about 
public affairs. Previous work has shown that anxiety boosts information-seeking behaviors, but only for information 
that is perceived as useful to solve the problem at hand (Valentino, Banks, Hutchings & Davis 2009). The economic 
and political context is more likely to be perceived as relevant to personal economic woes when economic hardship 
is widespread. In turn, when the individual is enduring economic hardship but the national economy is faring well, it 
is likely more difficult to see a solution for personal economic problems in the economic and the political context. 
These expectations are consistent with evidence that the concurrence of personal and collective deprivation bolsters 
political mobilization (Foster & Matheson 1995; Hansford & Gomez 2010; Lim & Sander 2013; Runciman 1966; 
but cf. Kern et al. 2015). The empirical implication of our argument is that worsening economic conditions at the 
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macro level are likely to ameliorate the expected negative effect of personal economic deprivation on information 
acquisition.  
Citizens who endure economic hardship likely display higher levels of knowledge in contexts of declining 
macroeconomic conditions than in contexts of economic stability or prosperity (Hypothesis 3). 
The expectations outlined above have important implications for the acquisition of information, and 
relatedly for voting and electoral accountability, during economic downturns. Our first hypothesis suggests that 
those in underprivileged economic situations are also informationally disadvantaged, with economic adversity 
serving to reinforce preexisting political inequalities. The implications of our second and third expectations are more 
optimistic, however. If citizens pay attention to public affairs when, from a normative point of view, it is most 
critical to do so, otherwise low levels of information need not cause alarm. In fact, economic crises may serve to 
reduce information inequalities between citizens of differing economic means.  
Empirical analyses: Data and method of analysis 
To gauge how prone voters are to acquiring economic and electoral information in the context of a recession, we 
take advantage of cross-national and temporal variation in economic conditions produced by the Great Recession. 
Our empirical innovation is to introduce a time-series component that helps us assess how levels of information have 
varied as a result of the onset of the recession (Kern et al. 2015). As we are interested in explaining change in 
information levels as a result of the recession, we introduce a country-level variable that controls for average pre-
crisis levels of economic and political information. By including baseline pre-crisis levels of information as a 
covariate, we complement the multilevel models with the characteristics of a conditional change model (Menard 
2007). The approach allows us to estimate the extent to which information levels deviate from the pre-crisis 
benchmark as a result of the economic recession. The results are conservative because our approach controls 
indirectly for other country-level variables that might affect information levels and detects only significant 
deviations from the pre-crisis benchmark.  
 Our analyses rely on data from the Eurobarometer surveys and from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) for economic and electoral information, respectively. When it comes to economic information, the 
Eurobarometer is the only survey, to our knowledge, that gauges voters’ levels of familiarity with macroeconomic 
trends. For electoral information, we rely on the CSES as all surveys are fielded at national elections. The election 
timing of the surveys is important to testing our argument because information on parties’ policy positions is most 
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useful at elections. Although we rely on different sources of data, we keep the analyses as comparable as possible 
by, for example, including a similar set of control variables and using an identical methodological approach. Direct 
comparison of the magnitude of coefficients is not possible, but the effects can be interpreted separately and 
compared in a meaningful way. Indeed, it is not infrequent in the literature to compare different types of knowledge 
(e.g., Fraile 2017). 
Economic information 
We rely on cross-sectional time-series survey data from twenty-six European democracies from a series of special 
Eurobarometer surveys (2007, 2009 and 2015) on national economics and statistics.
1
 We take the 2007 survey as a 
baseline for estimating average country-level economic information before the onset of the recession and model 
change with respect to that baseline. In doing so we control indirectly for other country-level variables that might 
affect information levels, such as media system types. Our goal is to test the explanatory power of changing 
economic conditions over the course of the crisis.  
We focus on information about unemployment levels for several reasons. The economic recession in our 
survey years is best reflected in the macroeconomic data on unemployment. While GDP took a dip in most 
European countries, in the survey years we have available (2009 and 2015) GDP growth was stable or modestly 
rising in many of the countries hardest hit by the recession; thus the rate of growth could not accurately capture the 
economic downturn. Furthermore, levels of unemployment have been most robustly linked to voter preferences, 
election results and accountability while the effects of economic growth and inflation on elections are less consistent 
(for a recent review, see Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013). Finally, while the Eurobarometer also gauges respondents’ 
information levels on economic growth and inflation, these questions produced high non-response rates.
2
 
Respondents were much more likely to answer the question on the levels of unemployment than they were either 
growth or inflation, suggesting a lower informational threshold. This is consistent with previous literature. While 
voters are generally uninformed about the state of the macroeconomy (e.g., Caplan 2002 Healy & Lenz 2014; 
                                                        
1
 For a list of countries included, see the Appendix. 
2
 In the case of the 2009 EB, 51 percent did not answer the question on economic growth, 46 percent did not answer 
the question on inflation, and 35 percent did not answer the question on unemployment. In 2015, those numbers 
were 33 percent, 33 percent and 21 percent, respectively. In 2007, those numbers were 65 percent, 56 percent and 49 
percent, respectively. Below we describe several robustness checks related to the large number of missing values. 
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Hellwig & Marinova 2016), they tend to perceive more accurately changes in unemployment levels (Conover, 
Feldman & Knight 1986; Di Tella, MacCulloch & Oswald 2001; Paldam & Nannestad 2000).   
To gauge information of the national rate of unemployment, responds were asked, “What was the official 
unemployment rate, the percentage of active people who do not have a job, in [our country] in 2008 [or 2014]? I can 
tell you that the exact figure is between 0% and 20% [or 30%].”3 In coding correct responses, we adopt somewhat 
loose criteria. We use a range of possible correct values rather than exacting a precise figure from respondents.
4
 
Roughly 30% of respondents provided a correct response across the 2009 and 2015 waves. Among the country-years 
with highest overall information are Greece-2015 (72%), Slovakia-2015 (61%), Sweden-2015 (48%) and Spain-
2015 (44%). On the lower end are Germany-2015 (10%) and Belgium-2009 (9%).  
Our main independent variable is change in national unemployment since the beginning of the economic 
crisis. We do this to assess the consequences of the full crisis episode and not only the consequences of change in 
unemployment from the previous year. For the 2009 wave, we estimate change in unemployment between 2006 and 
2008; for the 2015 wave, we estimate change between 2006 and 2014. Note that both measures are time-lagged to t-
1 in order to strengthen causal inference. As a robustness check, we also model absolute levels of unemployment at 
t-1 (see Appendix).  
To capture economic hardship at the individual level, we introduce a dummy variable for unemployed.
5
 
Recent scholarship suggests that being unemployed depresses political interest only in early adulthood; however, 
unemployment does not affect interest in politics later in life (Emmenegger et al. 2016).
6
 Hence we test the 
robustness of our findings to an alternative set of operationalizations of economic hardship at the individual level. 
The Eurobarometer offers a series of indicators on the ownership of goods; we apply principle-component analysis 
                                                        
3
 In the 2015 wave of the Eurobarometer, several countries surpassed the 20% threshold. 
4
 A response is considered correct if unemployment is under 5% and the respondent declares a figure also below 5%; 
likewise we define the following intervals: 5 to 8%; 8 to 10%; 10 to 15%; 15 to 20%; 20 to 25%; and 25 to 30%. We 
test the robustness of the results to an alternative set of operationalizations where correct response is anywhere 
within 2% or within 3% of the correct figure (see Appendix). 
5
 We adopt a minimalist approach to operationalizing personal economic hardship in order to keep the analyses of 
economic and electoral information comparable. 
6
 We do not find a statistically significant interaction effect between age and unemployment status. 
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to estimate individual wealth from these indicators. In addition, the 2009 and 2015 surveys include an indicator of 
economic hardship based on self-reported frequency with which respondents experienced difficulty paying their bills 
over the past year.  
We control for socioeconomic indicators that have been linked to individual costs and opportunities to 
acquire information. We include controls for gender, age, education, occupation status and family situation.
7
 At the 
country level, we include a binary indicator for the 2015 wave. Indirectly, we control for country-level differences 
that contribute to variation in economic information by accounting for baseline information levels prior to the crisis. 
We estimate a series of multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions. Formally we may express the 
probability of a correct response as 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1)|𝑋𝑖𝑗𝜁𝑗] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜁𝑗  (1), where 
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗 𝑡−1
 is the sum of correct responses divided by the sample 
size n in each country j in time period t-1 (in 2007), 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  indicates whether respondent i was unemployed 
at time t,  ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡 is change in the national rate of unemployment between 2006 and t-1 in country j, Xij 
is a vector of control variables, γ is a vector of slopes, and ζj constitutes country-specific factors not accounted for 
by the covariates that may otherwise affect the likelihood of offering a correct response (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 
2008; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). To test Hypothesis 3, we expand on the fixed part of the model with an interaction 
coefficient between 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  and  ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡 , and we allow the slope of 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  to vary 
across countries. The mixed-effects logistic regressions are fitted via maximum likelihood estimation. 
Electoral information 
We rely on survey data from twenty-eight elections from seventeen European countries covered after the onset of 
the Great Recession by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). We select elections for which a pre-
crisis election study allowed us to gauge baseline levels of electoral information.
8
 We operationalize electoral 
information as ability to position political parties on the left-right ideological spectrum. Given that the left-right is 
                                                        
7
 Coding information on each variable may be found in the Appendix. In the Appendix we also control for 
respondents’ prior occupation in the case of being unemployed. 
8
 For example, we exclude two studies fielded in Greece (2009, 2012) as no study was available prior to the start of 
the recession in 2008. For a list of election studies, see the Appendix. 
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dominated by economic issues (Huber & Inglehart 1995; Marks & Steenbergen 1999; Warwick 2002), this 
operationalization is a good proxy for citizens’ familiarity with party platforms on economic policy. We estimate 
how much each respondent's placement of each party on the scale deviates from political experts' placement of the 
corresponding party on the same scale and take the mean of the deviations for each respondent.
9
 Large values 
indicate inaccuracy; to ease interpretation, we reverse the scale. Respondents were overall very accurate in placing 
parties; the mean of information in our sample was 8 out of 10, ranging from 6.9 to 8.5 between countries. 
As in the economic information analyses, we test the effect of change in unemployment since the onset of 
the crisis. To estimate baseline electoral information, we use an election study that was fielded prior to the onset of 
the recession in each country, as the pre-crisis electoral cycle is the relevant comparison for electoral knowledge. 
For the countries in our sample, the start of the recession varied between 2007 and 2009; hence, we estimate change 
in unemployment between 2006 and the year of the corresponding election study. As a robustness check, we also 
model absolute levels of unemployment in the year prior to the survey as well as change in unemployment between 
pre-crisis and post-crisis levels of unemployment, both lagged to t-1 (see Appendix). At the individual level, we 
operationalize economic hardship with unemployment status and household income quantile. 
We control for individual-level differences that have been linked to variation in political information as 
individual characteristics can lower the costs of acquiring information (Althaus 2003; Berggren 2000; Delli Carpini 
& Keeter 1996; Fraile 2014; Gordon & Segura 1997; Grönlund & Milner 2006). We control for education, gender, 
age, occupational status and family situation.
10
 The models control indirectly for country-level differences that 
contribute to variation in political information by accounting for baseline information levels. The results are 
nonetheless robust to including election-level controls for the effective number of electoral parties, the electoral 
system, bicameral legislatures and compulsory voting (Berggren 2001; Gordon and Segura 1997; see Appendix). 
                                                        
9
 Expert placements of party positions rely on the judgments of the CSES collaborators. The CSES did not provide 
information on the number of national experts surveyed in each election; this information was available only for 
some elections (e.g., N=11 in Austria-2013). Expert placements are preferable to average voter placements due to 
potential endogeneity concerns (e.g., individuals’ placements may be affected by the severity of the crisis) as well as 
errors when voters place small parties (e.g., the UK election in 2015, as detailed in the CSES notes). 
10
 We also control for vote for the incumbent (see Appendix). 
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Finally, as the elections in our sample took place at different points during the crisis, we control for the year of the 
election with fixed effects. 
We estimate a series of multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions using maximum likelihood. The general 
model may be expressed as 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗  𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (2) , where Electoral Informationijt is the level of electoral information of 
individual i in election j at time t, and the remainder of terms is as described in Equation (1). To test Hypothesis 4 
for electoral information, we expand the model with an interaction coefficient between 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  and 
 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡  and a random slope for 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡.  
Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
The results offer considerable support for all three expectations. Rising rates of national unemployment since the 
crisis have contributed to substantial gains in information on macroeconomic trends and to modest gains in 
information on party positions. Economic hardship at the individual level translates into lower levels of knowledge, 
without regard to the type of information under study. At the aggregate level, increasing unemployment levels have 
a positive effect on knowledge that is large in magnitude in the case of economic knowledge and more modest in the 
case of electoral information. With respect to our final hypothesis, those experiencing economic hardship become 
increasingly informed of downward macroeconomic trends and party positions in contexts of an economic recession. 
These results are robust to several model specifications described below. 
Initial examination of the models in Tables 1 and 2 suggests strong face validity. Demographic predictors 
of information levels influence information levels in the expected direction, including gender, age, education, 
occupational status and family situation. Baseline level of information at the country level is a robust and strong 
predictor of post-crisis information levels (p<0.001), suggesting the validity of our time-series approach. Pre-crisis 
information levels alone explain 10% and 83% of the between-country variance in economic and electoral 
information acquisition, respectively.
11
 Partitioning the variance of the null models suggests that roughly 15% and 
                                                        
11
 Baseline levels of information account for subsequent levels of electoral information acquisition much better than 
they do for levels of macroeconomic information. We believe this is due to the relative stability of most parties’ 
policy positions over electoral cycles. In contrast, macroeconomic trends can vary considerably over time.  
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17% of the total variance in economic and electoral information levels, respectively, can be attributed to between-
country differences.
12
 
Table 1: Economic information: Correctly identifying the national rate of unemployment 
 (1) (2) 
Micro-level predictors   
Female -0.366
***
 -0.368
***
 
 0.0257 0.0257 
Age 0.032
***
 0.032
***
 
 0.0049 0.0050 
Age (sq.) -0.0001
***
 -0.0001
***
 
 0.00001 0.00001 
Education (in years) 0.010
***
 0.010
***
 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Occupation status (ref. Working)   
Not in labor force -0.153
***
 -0.151
***
 
 0.0383 0.0382 
Student 0.126 0.133 
 0.0816 0.0816 
Unemployed -0.312
***
 -0.407
***
 
 0.0504 0.0694 
Unemployed x ∆Unemployment  0.024* 
  0.0101 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Single with children -0.029 -0.027 
 0.0605 0.0605 
Partner, no children 0.135
***
 0.134
***
 
 0.0333 0.0333 
Partner, with children 0.052 0.052 
 0.0358 0.0358 
Macro-level predictors   
Baseline information, 2007 2.107
*
 2.154
*
 
 0.8645 0.8384 
∆Unemployment since 2007 0.162*** 0.159*** 
 0.0064 0.0065 
2015 wave -0.363
***
 -0.362
***
 
 0.0361 0.0361 
Constant -2.929
***
 -2.933
***
 
 0.3087 0.3027 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.418 0.423 
Unemployed  0.004 
Covariance  -0.041 
N 36,989 36,989 
                                                        
12
 Baseline models suggested a number of potential outliers at the country level; our results are robust to the 
exclusion of these cases from the models (see Appendix). 
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Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regression based on 56 country-years from 28 
countries. Model 1 includes a random slope. Model 2 includes a random slope and a random intercept for 
unemployed; the variance-covariance structure of the random effects is unstructured. Coefficient estimates and 
standard errors are reported. 
†
p < 0.1, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
Table 2. Electoral information: Positioning parties’ on the left-right  
 (1) (2) 
Micro-level predictors   
Female -0.055
***
 -0.055
***
 
 0.0092 0.0092 
Age 0.003 0.003 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0001 
 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.236
***
 0.235
***
 
 0.0130 0.0130 
Occupation status (ref. Working full-time)   
Not in labor force -0.083
***
 -0.084
***
 
 0.0137 0.0137 
Student 0.600
***
 0.602
***
 
 0.0825 0.0825 
Works part time -0.031 -0.032 
 0.0177 0.0177 
Unemployed -0.116
***
 -0.114
***
 
 0.0201 0.0211 
Unemployed x ∆Unemployment  0.008 
  0.0057 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Single with children 0.009 0.009 
 0.0378 0.0378 
Partner, no children 0.025 0.024 
 0.0134 0.0133 
Partner, with children 0.041
**
 0.041
**
 
 0.0153 0.0153 
Macro-level predictors   
Baseline information levels 0.933
***
 0.905
***
 
 0.1549 0.1496 
∆ Unemployment since 2006 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 0.0030 0.0031 
Constant 0.498 0.732 
 1.2837 1.2397 
Fixed effects election year Yes Yes 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.046 0.047 
Residual 0.703 0.703 
Unemployed  0.001 
Covariance  -0.006 
N 35,295 35,295 
Note: Estimates are based on 28 election studies from 17 European countries. The table presents estimates from 
mixed-effects linear regression with fixed effects for election year (estimates not shown). Model 1 includes a 
random slope. Model 2 includes a random slope and a random intercept for unemployed; the variance-covariance 
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structure of the random effects is unstructured. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported. 
†
p < 0.1, 
*
 p < 
0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
Beginning with micro-level effects, unemployed individuals are on average 4% less likely to be correct on 
the rate of unemployment than are those in the labor force when the unemployment rate is stable (p<0.001; see 
Table 1, Model 1). Similarly, the results on electoral information show that the experience of economic hardship as 
expressed by being unemployed, translates into an error of 0.1 points in placing each party on the left-right scale 
(p<0.001; Table 2, Model 1). Though modest, the negative effect of being unemployed on knowledge is roughly half 
that of education. These effects are consistent with previous literature and offer support for Hypothesis 1.  
Simultaneously, rising levels of unemployment at the national level exert a strong positive effect on 
economic information (p<0.001) and a modest positive effect on electoral information (p<0.05). As unemployment 
rises over the course of the crisis, individuals become more likely to gauge correctly the national rate of 
unemployment (Fig. 1). In countries where unemployment remained stable, the predicted probability of knowing 
this rate is under 0.15. As the unemployment rate climbs up, respondents are increasingly more likely to offer a 
correct response. Where unemployment had increased by 5%, 10% or 20% since the onset of the crisis, the 
respective probabilities of identifying the rate correctly were .25, .40 and .80. When it comes to economic 
information, the mobilization effect at the contextual level is significantly more powerful than the withdrawal effect 
at the individual level.  
When it comes to electoral information, the positive effect at the macro level is considerably weaker than 
the negative effect at the individual level. The effect of rising national unemployment exerts a positive, but weak, 
effect on political knowledge (p<0.05, Model 2 in Table 2). An increase in unemployment of 10% in magnitude is 
predicted to improve the correct positioning of parties by only a fraction of a point on the 11-point scale. Hence, the 
first two hypotheses receive support when it comes to electoral information, but the effect of the macroeconomy is 
modest. 
Furthermore, the models detect a statistically significant interaction between macro and micro-level 
unemployment that lends support to Hypothesis 3 (Models 2 in Tables 1 and 2). In both analyses, we use the full-
time employed as a basis of comparison. In the case of economic information, the difference in information levels 
between the working and the unemployed persist when the rate of unemployment declines, remains stable or 
increases by as much as 10% since the onset of the Great Recession. Where unemployment has climbed by more 
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than 10%, we no longer detect statistically significant differences in levels of economic knowledge between the 
unemployed and the working (Fig. 2). When it comes to electoral information, we observe a trend in the same 
direction that is stronger in magnitude. Namely, differences in information levels between the unemployed and 
working disappear when the national unemployment rate since the recession is upward of 7% (Fig. 3). In contexts of 
sharp increases in national unemployment, we no longer observe a negative effect of personal economic hardship on 
either type of information levels. 
Analyses with each of the alternative indicators of economic hardship at the individual level offer strong 
support for the results presented here (see full results in the Appendix). In the case of economic knowledge, both 
wealth and the experience of economic difficulties contribute to a withdrawal effect (p<0.001), but with only a two 
to three percent increase in the rate of unemployment since the recession, the less financially privileged become just 
as likely to state correctly the rate of unemployment as are those more economically secure (p<0.001). In the CSES 
data, we are able to operationalize economic hardship at the individual level as household income quantile, and we 
observe a statistically significant negative effect (p<0.001), such that voters in the lowest quantile were on average 
half a point less accurate in placing each party than were those in the highest quantile. Similarly to the results 
reported in Table 2, we observe a statistically significant interaction between economic hardship at the micro and 
macro levels. Regardless of how personal economic hardship is operationalized—as unemployment status, 
ownership of goods, self-reported difficulty in paying bills or income quantile—the economic recession equalized 
information levels about the state of the economy and party positions between those who experienced economic 
hardship and those who did not. 
Fig. 1. Predicted Probability of Economic Information by ∆Unemployment since the Onset of the Crisis 
18 
 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities based on Table 1, Model 1. The graph displays cluster-specific predicted probabilities 
for the fixed part of the model. The probability reflects the average respondent in our sample in a country of average 
pre-crisis levels of information (roughly 30%).  
 
Fig. 2. Conditional Marginal Effect of Unemployed on Economic Information 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities based on Table 1, Model 2. The graph displays cluster-specific predicted probabilities 
for the fixed part of the model. The probability reflects the average respondent in the sample in a country of average 
pre-crisis levels of information (roughly 30%).  
 
Fig. 3. Conditional Marginal Effect of Unemployed on Electoral Information 
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Note: Predictions based on Table 2, Model 2. The predictions reflect the average respondent in the sample in a 
country of average pre-crisis levels of electoral information (roughly 8 on a 0-10 scale).  
 
The results are robust to a series of additional specifications. First, we probe if our findings on economic 
knowledge are driven by systematic over-reporting of unemployment; if individuals tend to over-report levels of 
unemployment, then those in contexts of higher unemployment would get it right more often. On average, 
unemployment was over-reported by 4%, with a range of under-reporting by 2.7% in Spain-2015 to over-reporting 
by 10,6% in Hungary-2015, suggesting meaningful variation in unemployment estimates rather than systematic 
over-reporting.
13
 In the data, we observe a very strong correlation between levels of unemployment and the average 
estimate of unemployment per country (ρ=0.81), suggesting that estimates of unemployment generally track actual 
unemployment levels.  
Second, given the high number or missing values on economic knowledge (see fn. 4), we conduct two sets 
of ancillary analyses to test the robustness of the results to missing values. We explicitly model the mechanism of 
missingness. The results indicate that non-response is more likely when individuals experience unemployment 
(p<0.001) and are embedded in contexts of declining unemployment (p<0.05), but the effect of being unemployed is 
attenuated as unemployment increases (p<0.1). This results thus suggest that the mechanisms driving lack of 
knowledge also drive non-response. And further, we impute missing values for the dependent variable and re-run the 
                                                        
13
 As a norm, we do not observe over-reporting in cases of high unemployment. In the ten cases with highest level of 
unemployment in the dataset, only three registered over-reporting above average. Compare this to the ten cases with 
lowest unemployment in the sample, where five registered over-reporting above average. 
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analyses.
14
 The results from the models with imputed values replicate the results presented in Table 1 and lend 
further support to the hypotheses. 
We carry out a number of robustness checks for the models on electoral information (see Appendix). The 
models presented in Table 2 are robust to controls for ENEP, electoral system and bicameralism (Fraile 2014). We 
test the results to two alternative operationalizations of unemployment: change since the baseline CSES wave and 
absolute level of unemployment at t-1.  The results confirm the direct positive effect of unemployment on electoral 
knowledge as well as the conditional effect through individual unemployment status. Finally, we check how 
electoral knowledge varies between pre-existing parties and new party formations. While baseline levels of 
information predict only familiarity with pre-existing parties, the gist of the effects of national unemployment and 
unemployment status are as reported in Table 2.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
During good economic times a rational citizenry may well delegate policymaking and spare the time and effort 
necessary to acquire information. From a normative point of view, however, when the economy plummets, citizens 
have good reason to monitor public affairs closely and to invest resources in acquiring information. The goal of this 
article was to examine empirically the extent to which citizens kept abreast of macroeconomic trends and electoral 
proposals during the Great Recession.  
Our findings offer a nuanced understanding of information acquisition during economic downturns by 
identifying a set of parallel processes unfolding at the individual and contextual levels of analysis and for different 
types of information. First, our results help make sense of the conflicting findings in the literature on political 
engagement by documenting a set of opposing effects of economic conditions and underlining the importance of 
studying their separate effects at the micro and macro levels of analysis. Depending on whether it is personally 
experienced, or a contextual feature, economic hardship has different effects over economic and electoral knowledge. 
Economic hardship at the micro level contributes to a decline in information acquisition while the crisis experienced 
at the macro level increases the acquisition of information. Hence our results are consistent with the bulk of the 
                                                        
14
 We impute missing values based on individuals’ perceptions of economic performance (both unemployment and 
general economic situation), trust in official statistics, demographic variables and fixed effects for country and 
survey year. To avoid endogeneity, we did not include any of the main explanatory variables as predictors. 
N=48,595. See Appendix for full results. 
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literature that, based on the role of socioeconomic resources, argues that economic hardship reduces political 
engagement, but this effect holds only at the individual level of analysis. At the same time, our results are in line 
with work based on aggregate data that links hard economic conditions to higher levels of political engagement (e.g., 
Pontichelli & Voth 2011; Lim & Sander 2013; Hansford & Gomez 2010). Together, these results suggest that the 
distinction between levels of observation is critical to theories of information-seeking behavior and political 
engagement more broadly. 
 Second, we find that citizens do not possess high levels of information all the time, but that information 
levels depend on the economic context. In time of economic stability and prosperity, voters have low levels of 
information. However, as the economy plummets, the public tends to acquire information about the state of the 
economy and, to a lesser degree, party positions. At least in times of a recession of the magnitude of the Great 
Recession that began in 2008, lack of objective information on the state of the economy should not prevent effective 
economic voting. In this way our results carry further implications for understanding the weak and inconsistent 
effects that the state of the economy exerts on the vote (Anderson 2007; Kayser 2014). While a number of previous 
studies have placed emphasis on voters’ skewed perceptions of the state of the economy (e.g., Healy & Lenz 2014; 
Hellwig & Marinova 2016), our results show that voters are better informed when the stakes are higher. 
Third, our results show that the positive effects of a recession are quite substantive for economic 
information, but relatively modest for electoral information. When a hard recession hits, individuals’ economic 
information acquisition escalates while familiarity with party platforms at elections increases modestly. Although 
the relationship between economic hardship and the two types of knowledge is estimated using different data 
sources, the substantive interpretation of the results shows a clear difference. At least two factors may help explain 
the weaker effect of contextual economic hardship on electoral knowledge.  As we argue above, one factor has to do 
with the availability of information. While information about the state of the economy is readily accessible and 
highly salient particularly in times of economic upheaval, extant literature suggests that information about policy 
alternatives may not be available at the same rate. Hence the lack of forthcoming policy information may weaken 
the otherwise positive effect of citizens’ heightened motivation to become informed during an economic crisis. 
Second, the weak positive effect may also be due to the relative stability of party positions over electoral cycles and 
hence the limited predictive power of changes in macroeconomic conditions. This explanation is corroborated by the 
high predictive power of pre-crisis electoral information levels. To disentangle these alternative explanations, future 
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research should ideally measures electoral knowledge with respect to policy areas where parties have changed their 
positions.  
Finally, and probably most importantly, our results show that contextual economic hardship has an 
important effect on closing knowledge gaps. The unemployed, the poor and those expressing financial difficulty are 
less likely to be informed about public affairs. When a hard recession hits, however, these individuals’ information 
acquisition escalates, and disadvantaged groups catch up in information levels to their more economically secure 
counterparts. With about seven to ten percentage points rise in unemployment over the course of the crisis, we can 
no longer observe statistically significant differences in electoral and economic information levels, respectively, 
between the economically secure and insecure. Hence, the Great Recession had a palpable balancing effect on 
inequalities in knowledge for both types of knowledge. 
Our research has broader implications for voter decision-making and for the workings of representative 
democracy. The extant literature has generally been pessimistic about citizens’ levels of political awareness, 
stressing further that already scant levels of knowledge are experiencing a decline over time (e.g. Bennett 1989; 
Healy & Lenz 2014; Hellwig & Marinova 2016; Howe 2006; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). Things look even 
bleaker when we consider that knowledge is strongly conditioned by individual cognitive and economic resources, 
and that personal economic hardship depresses knowledge further. However, low information levels may be a sign 
of voter rationality. Our results show that citizens react to an economic recession by increasing their overall levels of 
knowledge and that the economically disadvantaged react in a stronger way that closes the knowledge gaps due to 
economic differences. Heightened and more equal political awareness in times of crises – that is, when it really 
matters – could make up for otherwise low information levels. 
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Tables 
Table 1. List of variables: Eurobarometer 
Variable name Coding 
Information of unemployment 1-correct when both unemployment and the R’s guestimate were 
in one of the following ranges: 0-5%, 5-8%, 8-10%, 10-15%, 15-
20%, 20-25%, 25-30%; coded 0 otherwise. 
Baseline information levels of 
unemployment, 2007 
Average levels of information of unemployment by country. 
Computed from Eurobarometer 67.2 fielded in 2007. 
Change in the national rate of 
unemployment, 2007 – t-1 
Change in unemployment between 2007 and 2008 (for 2009 
wave) and between 2007 and 2014 (for 2015 wave) 
National rate of unemployment, t-1 Absolute level of unemployment in 2008 (for 2009 wave) and in 
2014 (for 2015 wave) 
Age Continuous 
Age squared Age squared 
Female 1-female; 0-male 
Education Education in years 
Occupation Working (reference category); unemployed; not in labor force 
(retired, domestic worker); student. 
Household type Living alone (reference category); single with children; living 
with partner, no children; living with partner and children. 
Wealth Estimated by principle-component factor analysis based on a 
series of dummy variables indicating goods ownership (television, 
DVD player, music CD player, desk computer, laptop, tablet, 
smartphone, internet connection, car, apartment/house paid) 
Difficulty paying bills last year 1-Almost never/Never, 2-From time to time; 3-Most of the time 
2015 wave Dummy for 2015 wave 
 
Note: Data from Eurobarometer 83.3 (May 2015) and Eurobarometer 72.1 (August-September, 2009). In 
addition, Eurobarometer 67.2 (April-May, 2007) was used to estimate Baseline information levels of 
unemployment by country. Countries included are Austria (AT); Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); Cyprus (CY); 
Czech Republic (CZ); Germany (DE); Denmark (DK); Estonia (EE); Spain (ES); Finland (FI); France (FR); 
Great Britain (GB); Greece (GR); Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Italy (IT); Lithuania (LT); Luxembourg (LU); 
Latvia (LV); Malta (MT); Netherlands (NL); Poland (PL); Portugal (PT); Romania (RO); Sweden (SE); 
Slovenia (SI); Slovakia (SK). 
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Table 2. List of variables: CSES  
Variable name Coding 
Information of party positions We estimate how much each respondent's placement of each party on a 0 
to 10 left-right ideological scale deviates from political experts' 
placement of the corresponding party on the same scale and take the 
mean of the deviations for each respondent. We reverse the scale such 
that larger values indicate higher accuracy. 
Age Continuous 
Age squared Age squared 
Female Binary variable where 1-female. 
University degree Binary variable where 1-holds university degree. 
Unemployed Binary variable where 1-unemployed. 
Works part time Binary variable where 1-works part time (32 hours or less per week). 
Student Binary variable where 1-student, in school, in vocational training. 
Not in labor force Binary variable where 1-not in labor force (retired, housewife, disabled, 
others). 
Baseline political information Average levels of political information by country. Computed from an 
election study fielded before the onset of the recession. Year varies by 
country; see note below. 
Household type Living alone (reference category); single with children; living with 
partner or other adult, no children; living with partner or other adult and 
children. 
Household income Household income quantile. 
Voted for PM’s party Binary variable where 1-voted for PM’s party. 
Voted for Government 
incumbent party 
Binary variable where 1-voted for a party that is in government 
Change in the national rate of 
unemployment, 2006 – t-1 
Change in unemployment between 2006 and the year of the election. 
Source: Eurostat and the World Bank. 
Unemployment, t-1 National unemployment rate in the year prior to the election. Source: 
CSES, Eurostat or the World Bank. 
ENEP Effective number of electoral parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) 
District magnitude Number of representatives elected from a given district to the same 
legislative body 
PR Binary variable where 1-proportional representational system 
Majoritarian Binary variable where 1-majoritarian representational system 
Bicameral legislature Binary variable where 1-bicameral legislature 
Compulsory voting Binary variable where 1 indicates the presence of compulsory voting. 
Note: The source for all variables is the CSES unless otherwise noted.  
Note: To select the survey year used to compute baseline electoral information, we took account of the onset 
of the recession in each country and selected the most recent election study available prior to that year. The 
start of the recession varied between 2007 and 2009. One country in our sample did not experience a 
recession: Poland. 
Note: List of election studies included (in parentheses, election used to estimate pre-crisis baseline for 
electoral information): Austria-2013 (2008); Czech Republic-2010, 2013 (2006); Finland-2011, 2015 (2007); 
France-2012 (2007); Germany-2009, 2013 (2005); Iceland-2007, 2009, 2013 (2003); Ireland-2007, 2011 
(2002); Netherlands-2010 (2006); Norway-2009, 2013 (2005); Poland-2007, 2011 (2005); Portugal-2009, 
2015 (2005); Romania-2009, 2012 (2004); Slovenia-2008, 2011 (2004); Spain-2008 (2004); Sweden-2014 
(2006); Switzerland-2011 (2007); United Kingdom-2015 (2005). 
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Table 3. Economic information: Baseline models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline information levels, 
2007 
 1.786 1.872
*
 
  0.9395 0.9357 
2015 wave   0.322
***
 
   0.0246 
Constant -1.108
***
 -1.633
***
 -1.848
***
 
 0.1422 0.3073 0.3065 
Variance components    
Constant -0.561 -0.500 -0.492 
 0.1519 0.1346 0.1335 
Ni / Nj 39,187 / 28 39,187 / 28 39,187 / 28 
 
Note: Baseline models are used to estimate proportion of the variance at the country level and the variance 
explained by Baseline information levels at that level. See Fig. 1 for a plot of the country-level residuals. 
*
 p < 
0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
5 
 
 
Table 4. Economic information: Models in main text, excluding outliers (Slovenia and Poland; see Figure 1) 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels, 2007 2.064
**
 2.075
***
 
 0.6588 0.6014 
∆Unemployment since 2007 0.161*** 0.158*** 
 0.0064 0.0065 
Female -0.369
***
 -0.371
***
 
 0.0260 0.0260 
Age 0.032
***
 0.032
***
 
 0.0050 0.0050 
Age (sq.) -0.0001
***
 -0.0001
***
 
 0.00001 0.00001 
Education (in years) 0.010
***
 0.010
***
 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Occupation status (ref. Working)   
Not in labor force -0.155
***
 -0.153
***
 
 0.0387 0.0387 
Student 0.119 0.128 
 0.0827 0.0826 
Unemployed -0.300
***
 -0.375
***
 
 0.0508 0.0706 
Unemployed x ∆Unemployment  0.017‡ 
  0.0105 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Single with children -0.037 -0.035 
 0.0614 0.0614 
Partner, no children 0.147
***
 0.146
***
 
 0.0337 0.0337 
Partner, with children 0.065 0.064 
 0.0362 0.0362 
2015 wave -0.360
***
 -0.359
***
 
 0.0361 0.0361 
Constant -2.801
***
 -2.799
***
 
 0.2505 0.2379 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.240 0.247 
 0.0686 0.0701 
Unemployed  0.013 
  0.0133 
Covariance  -0.056 
  0.0325 
Ni / Nj 34,219 / 26 34,219 / 26 
 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 5: Economic information with absolute levels of unemployment at t-1 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Baseline information levels, 2007 2.325
**
 2.304
***
 
 0.7383 0.6787 
Unemployment rate, t-1 0.143
***
 0.141
***
 
 0.0059 0.0060
‡
 
Unemployment x Unemployed  0.011 
  0.0100 
Female -0.369
***
 -0.371
***
 
 0.0259 0.0260 
Age 0.032
***
 0.032
***
 
 0.0050 0.0050 
Age
2 
-0.0001
***
 -0.000
***
 
 0.00001 0.0000 
Education (years) 0.010
***
 0.010
***
 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Occupation status (ref. Working)   
Not in labor force -0.151
***
 -0.149
***
 
 0.0387 0.0387 
Student 0.120 0.127 
 0.0826 0.0826 
Unemployed -0.291
***
 -0.428
***
 
 0.0508 0.1226 
Household type (ref. Single)   
Single with children -0.037 -0.035 
 0.0613 0.0614 
Partner, no children 0.147
***
 0.146
***
 
 0.0336 0.0336 
Partner, with children 0.068 0.068 
 0.0362 0.0362 
2015 wave -0.291
***
 -0.290
***
 
 0.0351 0.0351 
Constant -3.801
***
 -3.780
***
 
 0.2773 0.2637 
Variance components   
Constant 0.302 0.309 
 0.0863 0.0882 
Slope unemployed  0.015 
  0.0243 
Covariance  -0.063 
  0.0395 
N 34,219 34, 219 
 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 6. Economic information: Correct response operationalized as within 2% or within 3% of the national 
unemployment rate 
 Within 2% Within 3% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline information levels, 2007 3.039
***
 3.084
***
 2.000
**
 2.019
**
 
 0.8289 0.8232 0.7221 0.7288 
∆ Unemployment since 2007 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 
 0.0061 0.0062 0.0054 0.0055 
Female -0.452
***
 -0.452
***
 -0.438
***
 -0.439
***
 
 0.0246 0.0246 0.0228 0.0228 
Age 0.031
***
 0.031
***
 0.027
***
 0.027
***
 
 0.0047 0.0047 0.0043 0.0043 
Age
2 
-0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 -0.000
**
 -0.000
**
 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Education 0.014
***
 0.014
***
 0.016
***
 0.016
***
 
 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
Occupation status (ref. Working)     
Not in labor force -0.184
***
 -0.184
***
 -0.200
***
 -0.199
***
 
 0.0367 0.0367 0.0340 0.0340 
Student 0.058 0.059 0.074 0.077 
 0.0789 0.0789 0.0717 0.0718 
Unemployed -0.339
***
 -0.391
***
 -0.339
***
 -0.385
***
 
 0.0488 0.0643 0.0438 0.0611 
Unemployment x Unemployed  0.013  0.013 
  0.0104  0.0106 
Household type (ref. Single)     
Single with children -0.030 -0.029 -0.038 -0.038 
 0.0574 0.0575 0.0523 0.0523 
Partner, no children 0.126
***
 0.126
***
 0.125
***
 0.124
***
 
 0.0318 0.0318 0.0296 0.0297 
Partner, with children 0.029 0.029 0.060 0.060 
 0.0343 0.0343 0.0316 0.0316 
2015 wave -0.219
***
 -0.218
***
 -0.393
***
 -0.392
***
 
 0.0334 0.0334 0.0309 0.0310 
Constant -2.992
***
 -2.997
***
 -1.976
***
 -1.977
***
 
 0.2958 0.2941 0.2596 0.2610 
Variance components     
Constant 0.384 0.381 0.291 0.290 
 0.1046 0.1040 0.0793 0.0792 
Slope unemployed  0.001  0.014 
  0.0040  0.0164 
Covariance  0.022  -0.003 
  0.0348  0.0294 
N 36,989 36,989 36,989 36,989 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 7. Economic information: Economic hardship operationalized as wealth or as difficulty paying bills 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline information levels, 2007 1.921
*
 1.988
*
 1.758
*
 1.793
*
 
 0.8392 0.8587 0.8421 0.7435 
∆Unemployment since 2007 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.127*** 
 0.0064 0.0065 0.0065 0.0087 
Female -0.351
***
 -0.362
***
 -0.350
***
 -0.364
***
 
 0.0258 0.0258 0.0258 0.0259 
Age 0.029
***
 0.033
***
 0.029
***
 0.032
***
 
 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 
Age (sq.) -0.000
**
 -0.000
***
 -0.000
**
 -0.000
***
 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Education (in years) 0.008
***
 0.009
***
 0.008
***
 0.010
***
 
 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018 0.0018 
Household type (ref. Single)     
Single with children -0.088 0.010 -0.085 0.018 
 0.0608 0.0609 0.0610 0.0611 
Partner, no children 0.075
*
 0.118
***
 0.079
*
 0.118
***
 
 0.0339 0.0336 0.0342 0.0337 
Partner, with children -0.051 0.045 -0.046 0.042 
 0.0372 0.0360 0.0373 0.0361 
Occupation status (ref. Working)     
Not in labor force -0.109
**
 -0.141
***
 -0.106
**
 -0.134
***
 
 0.0386 0.0385 0.0386 0.0387 
Student 0.092 0.097 0.111 0.106 
 0.0818 0.0831 0.0819 0.0830 
Unemployed -0.246
***
 -0.227
***
 -0.246
***
 -0.231
***
 
 0.0508 0.0518 0.0509 0.0522 
Wealth 0.189
***
  0.238
***
  
 0.0180  0.0301  
Wealth x ∆Unemployment   -0.017***  
   0.0049  
Difficulty paying bills (ref. Almost Never/Never)     
Sometimes  -0.229
***
  -0.325
***
 
  0.0319  0.0574 
Frequently  -0.333
***
  -0.614
***
 
  0.0500  0.1098 
Sometimes x ∆Unemployment    0.044*** 
    0.0086 
Frequently x ∆Unemployment    0.067*** 
    0.0129 
2015 wave -0.379
***
 -0.381
***
 -0.370
***
 -0.320
***
 
 0.0361 0.0363 0.0364 0.0374 
Constant -2.842
***
 -2.773
***
 -2.820
***
 -2.678
***
 
 0.3012 0.3077 0.3027 0.2838 
Variance components     
Constant 0.628 0.413 0.633 0.703 
 0.0859 0.1129 0.0870 0.2034 
Slope   0.100 0.046 
   0.0254 0.0171 
Covariance   -0.252 -0.140 
   0.2734 0.0534 
N 36,989 36,652 36,989 36,652 
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Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Table 8. Economic information: Models of missing values (1=Non-response; 0=Response) 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels, 
2007 
-1.037 -0.982 
 0.8489 0.8477 
∆Unemployment since 2007 -0.014* -0.016** 
 0.0056 0.0058 
Female 0.518
***
 0.518
***
 
 0.0230 0.0230 
Age -0.053
***
 -0.053
***
 
 0.0039 0.0039 
Age (sq.) 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 
 0.0000 0.0000 
Education (in years) -0.012
***
 -0.012
***
 
 0.0015 0.0015 
Household type (ref. Single)     
Single with children -0.008 -0.007 
 0.0461 0.0461 
With partner, no children -0.188
***
 -0.188
***
 
 0.0289 0.0289 
With partner and children -0.151
***
 -0.150
***
 
 0.0309 0.0309 
Occupation status (ref. Working)     
Not in labor force 0.248
***
 0.249
***
 
 0.0319 0.0319 
Student -0.071 -0.066 
 0.0757 0.0758 
Unemployed 0.279
***
 0.241
***
 
 0.0402 0.0576 
Unemployed # 
∆Unemployment 
 0.017
‡
 
  0.0103 
Trust official statistics -0.052
*
 -0.052
*
 
 0.0222 0.0222 
EB=2015 -0.787
***
 -0.785
***
 
 0.0313 0.0314 
Constant 0.613
*
 0.604
*
 
 0.2944 0.2945 
Variance components   
Constant 0.403 0.409 
 0.109 0.111 
Slope  0.025 
  0.019 
Covariance  -0.026 
  0.036 
N 49,449 / 28 49,449 / 28 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 9. Economic information: Models with imputed values of the dependent variable 
 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels, 
2007 
2.054 2.052 
 0.8365 0.8365 
∆Unemployment since 2007 0.117*** 0.114*** 
 0.0061 0.0062 
Female -0.361
***
 -0.363
***
 
 0.0263 0.0264 
Age 0.033
***
 0.032
***
 
 0.0051 0.0051 
Age (sq.) -0.0002
***
 -0.0002
***
 
 0.00005 0.00005 
Education (in years) 0.010
***
 0.010
***
 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Household type (ref. Single)     
Single with children -0.022 -0.021 
 0.0595 0.0595 
With partner, no children 0.135
***
 0.134
***
 
 0.0338 0.0338 
With partner and children 0.047 0.047 
 0.0368 0.0368 
Occupation status (ref. Working)     
Not in labor force -0.113
**
 -0.112
**
 
 0.0368 0.0368 
Student 0.107 0.114 
 0.0808 0.0807 
Unemployed -0.242
***
 -0.316
***
 
 0.0488 0.0633 
Unemployed # 
∆Unemployment 
 0.019
*
 
  0.0091 
EB=2015 -0.179
***
 -0.178
***
 
 0.0359 0.0359 
Constant -2.905
***
 -2.895
***
 
 0.3016 0.3016 
Variance components   
Constant 0.626 0.626 
 0.0859 0.0859 
Slope   
   
Covariance   
   
N 48,595 / 28 48,595 / 28 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
Note: Values of the dependent variable were imputed based on the following covariates: evaluation of the 
economic situation in respondent’s country, evaluation of the unemployment situation in respondent’s 
country, trust in official statistics, gender, age, square of age, education in year, household type, and fixed 
effects for country and survey year.  
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Table 10 
 (1) (2) 
 unempl_correct_c
at 
unempl_correct_c
at 
Baseline information levels, 
2007 
2.182
*
 2.205
**
 
 0.8681 0.8390 
Female -0.367
***
 -0.368
***
 
 0.0317 0.0318 
Age 0.028
***
 0.028
***
 
 0.0058 0.0059 
Age (sq.) -0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 
 0.0001 0.0001 
Education (in years) 0.005
*
 0.005
*
 
 0.0019 0.0019 
Household type (ref. 
living alone) 
  
Single with children 0.006 0.011 
 0.0719 0.0720 
With partner, no 
children 
0.110
**
 0.111
**
 
 0.0390 0.0391 
With partner and 
children 
0.056 0.058 
 0.0446 0.0447 
Occupation status (ref. 
Working) 
  
Not in labor force -0.258
*
 -0.238
*
 
 0.1179 0.1188 
Student -0.010 0.021 
 0.1429 0.1440 
Unemployed -0.451
***
  
 0.1239  
∆Unemployment since 2007 0.166
***
 0.162
***
 
 0.0076 0.0080 
Prior occupation (ref. 
Self-employed) 
  
Managers -0.137
**
 -0.136
**
 
 0.0525 0.0525 
Other white collars -0.276
***
 -0.276
** 
*
 
 0.0501 0.0502 
Manual workers -0.437
***
 -0.434
***
 
 0.0578 0.0579 
House persons -0.407
**
 -0.413
***
 
 0.1240 0.1244 
Unemployed -0.213 -0.134 
12 
 
 0.1341 0.1473 
Retired -0.172 -0.190 
 0.1154 0.1163 
Students 0.080 0.088 
 0.6415 0.6424 
EB=2015 -0.325
**
 -0.324
**
 
 0.1158 0.1161 
Working  0.000 
  . 
Unemployed  -0.513
***
 
  0.1524 
Unemployed # 
une_chng_crisis 
 0.013 
  0.0160 
Constant -2.398
***
 -2.423
***
 
 0.3256 0.3198 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N 25725 25725 
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Table 10. Electoral information: Baseline models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline information levels  1.011
***
 0.978
***
 
  0.1114 0.1368 
Constant 8.249
***
 -0.146 0.240 
 0.0967 0.9258 1.1326 
FE for election year No No Yes 
Variance components    
Constant 0.159 0.0268 0.041 
Residuals 0.742 0.742 0.752 
N 40,769 40,769 40,769 
 
Note: Baseline models are used to estimate proportion of the variance at the country level and the variance 
explained by Baseline information levels at that level. See Fig. 4 for a plot of the country-level residuals. 
*
 p < 
0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 11. Electoral information with absolute levels of unemployment at t-1 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels 0.960
***
 0.961
***
 
 0.1507 0.1328 
Unemployment rate, t-1 0.014
***
 0.013
***
 
 0.0032 0.0033 
Female -0.055
***
 -0.055
***
 
 0.0092 0.0092 
Age 0.003 0.003 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Age (sq.) -0.000 -0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.236
***
 0.235
***
 
 0.0130 0.0130 
Occupation status (ref. Working full-time)   
Not in labor force -0.083
***
 -0.083
***
 
 0.0137 0.0137 
Student 0.600
***
 0.600
***
 
 0.0825 0.0825 
Works part time -0.031 -0.032 
 0.0177 0.0177 
Unemployed -0.116
***
 -0.210
***
 
 0.0201 0.0505 
Unemployment rate, t-1 x Unemployed  0.012
*
 
  0.0057 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Single with children 0.010 0.009 
 0.0378 0.0378 
Partner, no children 0.025 0.024 
 0.0133 0.0133 
Partner, with children 0.041
**
 0.040
**
 
 0.0153 0.0153 
Constant 0.185 0.181 
 1.2495 1.1015 
Fixed effects election year Yes Yes 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.044 0.045 
Residual 0.703 0.703 
Unemployed  0.003 
Covariance  -0.011 
N 35,295 35,295 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 12. Electoral information: Placement of pre-existing parties (Models 1 and 2) and new parties and party 
coalitions (Models 3 and 4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline information levels 0.943
***
 0.913
***
 -0.010 -0.006 
 0.1488 0.1437 0.0372 0.0354 
∆Unemployment rate since 2006 0.006* 0.005 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 0.0031 0.0031 0.0006 0.0006 
Female -0.061
***
 -0.061
***
 0.006
**
 0.006
**
 
 0.0093 0.0093 0.0019 0.0019 
Age 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 0.0017 0.0017 0.0003 0.0003 
Age (sq.) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.240
***
 0.240
***
 -0.004 -0.004 
 0.0132 0.0132 0.0026 0.0026 
Occupation status (ref. Working full-time)     
Not in labor force -0.084
***
 -0.085
***
 0.001 0.001 
 0.0139 0.0139 0.0028 0.0028 
Student 0.606
***
 0.608
***
 -0.005 -0.005 
 0.0838 0.0838 0.0167 0.0167 
Works part time -0.025 -0.025 -0.007 -0.007 
 0.0180 0.0180 0.0036 0.0036 
Unemployed -0.117
***
 -0.114
***
 0.002 0.001 
 0.0205 0.0214 0.0041 0.0043 
∆Unemployment x Unemployed  0.006  0.002 
  0.0058  0.0012 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)     
Single with children 0.010 0.010 -0.000 -0.001 
 0.0384 0.0384 0.0076 0.0076 
Partner, no children 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.002 
 0.0136 0.0136 0.0027 0.0027 
Partner, with children 0.037
*
 0.037
*
 0.004 0.004 
 0.0155 0.0155 0.0031 0.0031 
Constant 0.427 0.680 0.073 0.043 
 1.2332 1.1907 0.3080 0.2933 
Fixed effects election year     
Variance components     
Intercept 0.042 0.043 0.003 0.003 
Residual 0.725 0.725 0.029 0.029 
Unemployed  0.001  0.00001 
Covariance  -0.005  -0.003 
N 35285 35285 35285 35285 
Note: The dependent variable is estimated based only on parties that competed in the previous electoral cycle. 
The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001 
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Table 13. Electoral information: ∆Unemployment from baseline wave  
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels 0.929
***
 0.899
***
 
 0.1598 0.1530 
∆Unemployment rate since 
baseline wave 
0.011
***
 0.011
***
 
 0.0030 0.0030 
Female -0.055
***
 -0.055
***
 
 0.0092 0.0092 
Age 0.003 0.003 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Age (sq.) -0.000 -0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.236
***
 0.235
***
 
 0.0130 0.0130 
Occupation status (ref. 
Working full-time) 
  
Not in labor force -0.083
***
 -0.084
***
 
 0.0137 0.0137 
Student 0.600
***
 0.602
***
 
 0.0825 0.0825 
Works part time -0.031 -0.032 
 0.0177 0.0177 
Unemployed -0.116
***
 -0.110
***
 
 0.0201 0.0214 
∆Unemployment x 
Unemployed 
 0.003 
  0.0043 
Household type (ref. Single, 
no children) 
  
Single with children 0.010 0.010 
 0.0378 0.0378 
Partner, no children 0.025 0.024 
 0.0134 0.0133 
Partner with children 0.041
**
 0.041
**
 
 0.0153 0.0153 
Constant 0.537 0.783 
 1.3238 1.2679 
Fixed effects for year Yes Yes 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.049 0.050 
Residual 0.703 0.703 
Unemployed  0.001 
Covariance  -0.006 
N 35,295 35,295 
Note: Change in unemployment is estimated with respect to the year of the CSES wave used as pre-crisis 
baseline of information levels and lagged to t-1. The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic 
regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 14. Electoral information: Country-level controls for electoral system  
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels 1.646
**
 1.540
**
 
 0.5062 0.4686 
∆Unemployment rate since 2006 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 0.0032 0.0032 
Female -0.055
***
 -0.055
***
 
 0.0092 0.0092 
Age 0.003 0.003 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Age (sq.) -0.000 -0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.232
***
 0.231
***
 
 0.0130 0.0130 
Occupation status (ref. Working full-time)   
Not in labor force -0.083
***
 -0.084
***
 
 0.0137 0.0137 
Student 0.601
***
 0.602
***
 
 0.0825 0.0825 
Works part time -0.032 -0.032 
 0.0177 0.0177 
Unemployed -0.117
***
 -0.112
***
 
 0.0201 0.0214 
∆Unemployment x Unemployed  0.003 
  0.0043 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Single with children 0.010 0.010 
 0.0378 0.0378 
Partner, no children 0.025 0.025 
 0.0133 0.0133 
Partner with children 0.041
**
 0.041
**
 
 0.0153 0.0153 
ENEP, log -0.489
***
 -0.469
***
 
 0.0935 0.0909 
PR system 0.104 0.225 
 0.4326 0.3930 
Majoritarian system 1.460
*
 1.637
**
 
 0.6419 0.6015 
Bicameral legislature -0.029 -0.083 
 0.3349 0.3077 
Compulsory voting . . 
   
Constant -4.771 -4.004 
 4.2353 3.9224 
Fixed effects for year Yes Yes 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.307 0.295 
Residual 0.702 0.702 
Unemployed  0.001 
Covariance  -0.015 
N 35,295 35,295 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 15. Electoral information: Personal economic hardship operationalized as income quantile 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels 0.937
***
 0.903
***
 
 0.1474 0.1417 
∆Unemployment rate since 2006 0.017*** 0.022*** 
 0.0032 0.0064 
Female -0.064
***
 -0.063
***
 
 0.0100 0.0100 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 0.0018 0.0018 
Age (sq.) 0.000 0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.194
***
 0.193
***
 
 0.0141 0.0141 
Occupation status (ref. Working full-time)   
Not in labor force -0.039
*
 -0.039
*
 
 0.0153 0.0153 
Student 0.367
***
 0.365
***
 
 0.0922 0.0923 
Works part time 0.018 0.019 
 0.0189 0.0189 
Unemployed -0.031 -0.037 
 0.0225 0.0226 
Income quantile 0.060
***
 0.065
***
 
 0.0042 0.0097 
∆Unemployment x Income  -0.002 
  0.0018 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Single with children -0.033 -0.023 
 0.0398 0.0398 
Partner, no children -0.048
**
 -0.032
*
 
 0.0152 0.0157 
Partner with children -0.038
*
 -0.019 
 0.0174 0.0178 
Constant 0.448 0.693 
 1.2219 1.1750 
Fixed effects for year Yes Yes 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.041 0.068 
Residual 0.662 0.661 
Income quantile  0.001 
Covariance  -0.006 
N 28,475 28,475 
Note: The table presents estimates from mixed-effects logistic regressions. 
‡
 p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 16. Electoral information: Control for Voted for PM’s party or governing incumbent party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Voted PM’s party 0.032** 0.032**   
 0.0123 0.0123   
Voted for incumbent 
party 
  0.070
***
 0.070
***
 
   0.0105 0.0105 
Baseline information 
levels 
0.970
***
 0.961
***
 0.980
***
 0.987
***
 
 0.1843 0.1841 0.1954 0.1952 
∆Unemployment rate 
since 2006 
0.012
***
 0.011
***
 0.014
***
 0.013
***
 
 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 
Female -0.039
***
 -0.039
***
 -0.050
***
 -0.050
***
 
 0.0098 0.0098 0.0095 0.0095 
Age 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 
Age (sq.) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.226
***
 0.225
***
 0.237
***
 0.236
***
 
 0.0139 0.0139 0.0132 0.0132 
Occupation status (ref. 
Working full-time) 
    
Not in labor force -0.072
***
 -0.073
***
 -0.074
***
 -0.074
***
 
 0.0149 0.0149 0.0144 0.0144 
Student 0.522
***
 0.524
***
 0.549
***
 0.552
***
 
 0.0902 0.0902 0.0870 0.0870 
Works part time -0.041
*
 -0.040
*
 -0.028 -0.028 
 0.0199 0.0199 0.0181 0.0181 
Unemployed -0.118
***
 -0.121
***
 -0.118
***
 -0.118
***
 
 0.0206 0.0207 0.0204 0.0205 
∆Unemployment x 
Unemployed 
 0.012
*
  0.011 
  0.0056  0.0056 
Household type (ref. 
Single, no children) 
    
Partner, no children -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 
 0.0394 0.0394 0.0385 0.0385 
Partner with children 0.020 0.020 0.016 0.015 
 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 
Partner with children 0.035
*
 0.034
*
 0.032
*
 0.031
*
 
 0.0159 0.0159 0.0156 0.0156 
Constant 0.178 0.251 0.097 0.037 
 1.5340 1.5327 1.6269 1.6249 
Variance components     
Intercept 0.0573 0.0573 0.0648 0.0652 
Residual 0.6510 0.6509 0.6520 0.6519 
Unemployed  0.00003  0.0001 
Covariance  0.0014  -0.0018 
N 28,750 28,750 30,914 30,914 
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Table 17. Economic information: Controls for prior occupation 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline information levels 2.100
*
 2.108
*
 
 0.8643 0.8366 
Female -0.366
***
 -0.367
***
 
 0.0258 0.0258 
Age 0.032
***
 0.032
***
 
 0.0050 0.0050 
Age (sq.) -0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 
 0.0000 0.0000 
University degree 0.010
***
 0.010
***
 
 0.0017 0.0017 
Household type (ref. Single, no children)   
Partner, no children -0.030 -0.028 
 0.0607 0.0608 
Partner with children 0.136
***
 0.135
***
 
 0.0335 0.0335 
Partner with children 0.049 0.049 
 0.0360 0.0360 
Occupation status (ref. Working)   
Not in labor force -0.153
***
 -0.152
***
 
 0.0384 0.0384 
Student 0.093 0.097 
 0.0829 0.0828 
Unemployed -0.395
***
 -0.387
***
 
 0.0817 0.0844 
Unemployed x ∆Unemployment  0.028* 
  0.0125 
∆Unemployment since 2007 0.159*** 0.157*** 
 0.0065 0.0066 
Prior occupation (ref. working)   
Self-employed 0.399
**
 0.234 
 0.1489 0.1642 
Managers 0.133 -0.055 
 0.1541 0.1739 
Other white collar 0.076 -0.111 
 0.1199 0.1421 
Manual workers -0.011 -0.217 
 0.2336 0.2490 
Other: House, Retired, Student -0.220 -0.538 
 0.3411 0.3712 
Wave 2015 -0.355
***
 -0.343
***
 
 0.0371 0.0374 
Constant -2.911
***
 -2.912
***
 
 0.3093 0.3029 
Variance components   
Intercept 0.4181 0.4228 
 0.1143 .1156 
Unemployed  0.0042 
  0.0085 
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Covariance  -0.0422 
  0.0440 
N 36348 36348 
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Figures 
Figure 1 . Economic information: Caterpillar plot of country-level residuals with 95% confidence intervals 
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Note: The caterpillar plot shows country-level residuals from Model 3 in Table 3 for each country-year. These 
residuals represent departures from the overall mean (horizontal line at 0). Four country-years stand out as 
outliers: Slovenia-2009, Slovenia-2015, Poland-2009 and Poland-2015 (bottom left). 
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of economic information by wealth 
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Note: Predicted probabilities of economic information by change in unemployment and wealth (1.5 standard 
deviations below and above the mean). When unemployment increases by more than 3%, there predicted 
probabilities for the two groups are not statistically different. Estimations are based on Model 3 in Table 7. 
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Figure 3. Predicted probability of economic information by difficulty paying bills 
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Note: Predicted probabilities of economic information by difficulty paying bills (Almost never and Most of 
the time). When unemployment increases by more than 2%, there predicted probabilities for the two groups 
are not statistically different. Estimations are based on Model 4 in Table 7. 
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Figure 4. Electoral information: Caterpillar plot of country-level residuals with 95% confidence intervals 
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Note: The caterpillar plot shows country-level residuals from Model 3 in Table 8 for each election. These 
residuals represent departures from the overall mean (horizontal line at 0). No country-years stand out as 
outliers. 
